I recently watched an episode of the PBS series "frontline". The episode was "Endgame", describing the timeline of the war in Iraq, and the supposed direction in which it is going. This is the paper I wrote summarizing the film along with my opinions on the war.
The PBS Documentary “Endgame” describes the methods and strategies by which the American Military has battled in the War in Iraq. Since the original Iraqi invasion, I have not supported nor understood the motives behind the war. I feel that this documentary was made for the benefit of people like me, who have been left in the dark by biased media that leaves motives and strategies out of their stories. I now understand better the timeline of the war, along with the strategical attempts at success. This film has reinforced my doubt in the abilities of the Military and the Department of Defense to make a plan and stick with it in order to finish the war.
The film begins in the first weeks of the war, when then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was excited and energetic about the prospects of defeating the terrorist organizations of the Middle East. Soon after Saddam Hussein’s removal, as looting and violence increased and critics became more brutal against so-called strategic decisions, Rumsfeld resigned to a more passive role. Half of the American people were angry because “..our plan, essentially, was we didn’t have a plan”1, including myself. At the time, the war was costing the taxpayers nearly 100 million dollars annually2, and why would any human want to give their hard-earned money to fund a war that had no clear plan? According to the generals, the decision-making power was no longer being controlled by the Secretary of Defense, but rather by the generals. On April 16th 2003, the leader of US Invasion forces, General Tommy Franks visited Baghdad and promised his troops that a new Iraqi government would be in place within 60 days, and nearly all of the troops would be pulled out by late 20033. Soon after, the government begins celebrating and announcing the victory of the war, including the now infamous declaration of “Mission Accomplished” by President Bush aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.
In conjunction with the victory of the war was the sudden departure of the leaders of the forces in Iraq, namely General Franks. Franks was replaced by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, “...quite possibly the most junior Lieutenant General in the US Army”4. Sanchez was expected to conduct the reduction and withdrawal of troops, and didn’t expect the sudden increase of insurgency attack. The leaders of the army had not provided Sanchez with a functional plan for dealing with insurgency. In fact, the possibility of insurgent uprising had not even been discussed. Meanwhile in Washington, the heads of state are publicly denying any mishaps, maintaining that the war is a victory, and they are working on pulling all troops out.
The tides turned in March 2004 when four US contractors were killed, burned, and strung from a bridge in Fallujah. In April the Marines enter Fallujah to clear it of insurgents, but the Iraqi soldiers who were expected to aid them failed to come, and after three difficult and bloody days of battle, Sanchez called off the attack in what was called “A black eye for the U.S.”5 To add insult to injury, the Abu Grahib Prison scandal erupts less than two months later. These revalations only further aggravated the Iraqi people, and it was clear to Iraqi people that this war was long from over. In Summer of 2004, during the midterm election season, President Bush publicly recognized the need for a shift in leadership. General Sanchez conveniently steps down and is replaced by General George Casey. Rumsfeld announces that the new strategy is to gradually turn over responsibility to the developing Iraqi military. This included a theatre-wide campaign to eliminate insurgents, and replacing the priority of defeat with the goal of providing Iraq with stable legislation and defense. A key term of this new strategy was keeping a “light footprint” , or “staying on large forward-operating bases and only engaging the insurgents when absolutely necessary”6. Critics wondered how this would work in a country of three very different peoples; the Sunni, Shia and Kurds, when it seems like all they do is try to kill one another. They have never been able to work together before, so how could we expect them to suddenly unite toward a common goal under the influence of the United States Military? This is yet another strategy that I do not understand. As part of an effort to improve ties with the individual people of Iraq, General Casey signed a cease fire of sorts with Muqtada Al-Sadr, in which the Military bough back nearly 1.5 million dollars worth of stolen American weapons, and provided funds for the restoration of Sadr city. In exchange, the Shia agreed to stop attacks on the military.
After the deal with Sadr, there was a shift in the strategy. Rather than physically removing insurgents, the United States would take a political approach to finishing the war. This new strategy focused on quickly forming a strong government that can then deal with insurgents on its own. Although the war took a new focus, there were still battles to be fought. Fallujah became an increasing threat; and it was apparent that holding elections for the new government would be pointless until it had been cleared of the insurgents. It was an intense ten-day battle that killed nearly 1,000 Sunni insurgents.
Once Fallujah is cleared, the nation holds the all-important first elections since the removal of Saddam Hussein. This optimistic event was seen around the world; entire families dressed in their best clothes going to vote, and emerging with a stained finger for identification. Although this was seen as an advance, we can tell now that something was wrong. In protest of the second clearing of Fallujah, the Sunni refused to vote. The result was a legislature that did not represent at least one third of the population. Although this seemed like a huge step toward democracy and the end of the war, we can see now that "By giving political candidates a huge incentive to campaign by demonizing the sectarian and the ethnic other … what we tended to do with that early push towards democratization is to rapidly accelerate the descent of the country into what is now civil war."7 The new government in Iraq was not the only new force in the war. Condoleeza Rice replaced Gen. Colin Powell as Secretary of State, and immediately dispatched intelligence to report on the goings-on of the war. In Iraq, the Shia-dominant government further divided the country, forcing Sunni insurgents to attack even more, and leaving US forces in the middle.
In Tal-Afar, northern Iraq, a new strategy is being used; Clear, Hold, Build. This involves clearing the neighborhoods one by one of insurgents, holding the town to make sure that no new insurgents will enter, and rebuilding a democratic city to join the nation of Iraq. In Tal-Afar, soldiers went to every house individually, rather than patrolling through in tanks and Humvees like they were doing in the South. Secretary Rice takes notice of this, and presents the plan’s success to the Department of Defense, who shrug it off as Iraq’s job after we leave. I actually believe that Rumsfeld was not against the idea, but rather against Sec. Rice presenting it, as deducing new strategy was his job.
In late 2006, the Democrats took control of the US House of Representatives, threatening the Administration to end the war and do it quickly. After the President releases a statement including his plans to implement the Clear, Hold and Build strategy, Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld steps down. Although the Democrats are happy to have a new plan for finishing the war, they are not happy to hear that it would require a 35,000 man surge.
Now, it is said that we are in the Endgame of sorts. In the game of chess, the Endgame is the strategy to either win or lose the game. There comes a time towards the end of every game when it becomes apparent who will be the victor, after which both players go through the moves to end the game in proper fashion. Unfortunately, I don’t think the US Military is playing much of an endgame. The US is still fighting to win as victory is moving farther away.
In my opinion, the fatal mistake in the Iraq war was entering it in the first place. After the attacks on the World Trade Centers, Americans wanted nothing more than to eliminate the enemy: Al Qaeda, not Saddam Hussein. Yes, Hussein was a terrible dictator, but he was no larger threat than a terrorist group who had just killed over 3,000 Americans in an attack. He needed to be removed, but the middle of a war and massive headhunt for another threat to America was not the time to do it. Yes, Hussein has been executed, but what about Osama Bin Laden? I often hear people say a cliche and meaningless phrase to describe their stance on the war: “Stay in Iraq until the job is done”. Every time I hear this phrase, I ask myself “What is this job they speak of?” Since the declaration of “Mission Accomplished’ nearly five years ago, I oft wonder what this all-important job really is, and why it’s taking so long to complete it.
After entering the war, strategy shift was too frequent. After a major step forward, leadership would change, and suddenly violence would increase again. It’s like the coach of a team removing the star player after he has just scored an important goal. It also seemed that with every shift in leadership came a shift in strategy as well. In any attempt, be it petty persuasion or global war, changes in strategy are a major setback. The departure of Gen. Tommy Franks was the first in many changes that set back the war significantly, rather than push forward development as promised. In order to end the war, the US needs to choose a strategy and stick to it. In “US Policy Options for Iraq”, several strategies are discussed, and the US is encouraged to choose a strategy and carry it through. This includes leaving significantly more of the decision-making powers to the new Iraqi government, and reducing the number of troops only when violence declines8. Although this strategy is more of a “wait-and-see’ strategy, and implies that troops could stay in Iraq for years before the war can be ended, it would bee incredibly refreshing for the US to stick with a strategy until the end, whenever that may be.
There were some clear and fatal mistakes at the beginning of the war, from invading without a clear plan for success to the frequent changes in leadership and plans. Now, we need to put those mistakes behind us, strive to exit Iraq, and finally end the war; something every American, Democrat, Republican or Green, has been waiting for.
watch the film for yourself at frontline.org
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
