War and International Security

ceila30's picture

            War. The word, itself, strikes fear into the hearts of most of the globe’s population. Therefore, nullifying the realist perspective that war is caused because of an innate human predominance to aggression. So, what then are the causes of war? Does the fault lie in the hands of individual leaders or perhaps in a states proximity to another state? Maybe, it is a countries cultural conditioning or does the blame land primarily on the shoulders of global characteristics and hegemony? “Inventories of war’s origins invariably  conclude that [all of these] are incomplete, in part because most agree war is rooted in innumerable sources at various levels of analysis” (qtd. in Kegley 403). So all three levels of analysis will be analyzed.

            In the first level of analysis, the individual, many theories and speculations have been made to explain why war occurs. The territorial imperative seems a logical explanation of war, on the surface. It is bloodletting territories, such as the Balkans and Sudan, which cause people to inquire if territorial desires cause people to become violent. Perhaps, this explanation does best explain ethnic battles throughout history. Many have also claimed that aggression is an innate human condition and that because of man’s desire to survive they will always use aggression in an effort to do so. For example, keeping in line with this way of thinking, Adolph Hitler and his fellow compatriots would be responsible for all that occurred in Nazi Germany, but is that a fair level of analysis, or is it more likely, that not everyone in Nazi Germany felt the same way as Hitler. “Most social scientists now strongly disagree with this realist premise that humans are essentially selfish and aggressive and that people murder and kill because of their innate genetic drives to act aggressively” (Kegley 405). Therefore, it seems safe to assume that aggression is a learned behavior.

            Nationalism, national character, and cultural conditioning tend to rear their ugly head when looking at both, individual and state levels of analysis. National character could drive certain nationalities to aggression, whereas, nationalism and cultural identities can lead to similar results. “[…] most governments encourage their populations to glorify the state and to accept whatever decisions their leaders claim are necessary for national security, including warfare against adversaries” (Kegley 407). The U.S. invasion of Iraq is an example of this way of thinking. After September 11th, U.S. citizens were very patriotic and very mad. Unfortunately, this sense of patriotism leads to an unwavering and unquestioned act of aggression against Afghanistan and then Iraq. The type of governmental system a state has also is thought to have a place in the second level of analysis because of the widespread acceptance that democracies do not fight other democracies, at least not in the present day.

            The third and final level of analysis looks at the global system and if it causes wars. It is thought that because of globalization and the resulting decentralized character of the global system, international anarchy ensues, thus, promoting wars. However, this, just like all the other determinants of war, does not paint a complete picture. It remains clear that the cause of war has many intervening variables. Fear tends to be one of these variables, perhaps the most important one. The present international system is more prone to war then the multipolar system that existed before World War I and II because it is unlikely that the rest of the world will continue to be as accepting of the hegemonic state of the U.S., especially since many believe the U.S. is taking advantage with their power. However, a multipolar system is more prone to misunderstandings, although, they are also more prone to keeping each other in check. Perhaps, if the world was unipolar with a single governmental system in place the threat of war would disseminate. I do not mean a hegemonic control, but rather a collectively agreed upon unipolar system.

            Nuclear weapons in the international community also play an integral part in world politics. Nuclear weapons serve as a symbol of power. The U.S. used nuclear weapons as a form of coercive diplomacy. The idea was to make others do what they may not normally do, by threatening them; this was called compellence.  As proliferation of nuclear weapons spread to other countries, namely the Soviet Union, the strategy of strong-arming the rest of the world as a form of deterring war had to change. Thus, American policymakers among others agreed upon the use of deterrence. “Whereas compellence contains an offensive coercive threat aimed at persuading an adversary to relinquish something without resistance, deterrence seeks to dissuade an adversary from undertaking some future action” (Kegley 473). On the other hand, deterrence requires second-strike capabilities. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) was a phrase used to describe what would likely happen if either the U.S. attacked the Soviet Union  or vice versa. Eventually the Cold War ended and yet again, a new strategy was needed. “New nuclear threats are on the horizon. This is why the United States has vigorously pushed forward with plans to develop an antiballistic missile system while simultaneously declaring a willingness to undertake preemptive action against emerging dangers” (Kegley 474). However, if one country can take action based on what they think another country is going to do what is going to stop any other country from doing the same exact thing?

            There have been regimes put into place to manage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. One of these is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which is an international agreement that seeks to prevent any new nuclear states being born. NPT is looked upon as being hypocritical by states that do not have nuclear weapons because they feel the powers that do have nuclear weapons just want to continue having all the power and control. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was rejected by the United States, proving that nuclear proliferation is on unstable ground. However, a daring step was taken towards nuclear disarmament in 2002 with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the U.S. and Russia, which promised a reduction of their nuclear arsenals by two-thirds, by 2012.

            It remains clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons has probably played a part in diffusing issues between certain countries. However, the question is, will there ever be a nuclear war? The scientists tend to agree that in the event of a nuclear war, nuclear winter is inevitable. Is there any dispute in the world worth the possibility of the end of all human existence? For several years, a concept known as firebreak, has kept all nuclear powers in check, but has the fire jumped the firebreak?

            On one hand, it seems logical to deny Iran the right of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, what gives the United States the right to dictate whether Iran has that bargaining chip, especially since there are 44 countries with nuclear power and research reactors with the capability of producing the ingredients needed for the making of a nuclear weapon? I believe Iran is just as unlikely to use nuclear weapons as everyone else who has them; the cost of their use is simply too high. Preventative war is not a strategy. The U.S. would be making a horrible mistake if they decided to enter into a war with Iran in the attempt to derail their nuclear program. The results would be devastating. The United States would have to go unilaterally because most would not support them. Not to mention, attacking Iran would create an increasingly anti-American attitude among those in Iran as well as in other Middle Eastern countries. There is no better way to unite a people against you then to attack them, just ask any American how they felt after 9/11, or after Pearl Harbor.

 Kegley, Charles W. World Politics: Trend and Transformation. Thomas:United States. 2007.